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LESSONS FROM GAME THEORY ABOUT
HUMANIZING NEXT-GENERATION
WEAPONS
Richard Jordan*
ABSTRACT
This article draws a parallel between nuclear weapons and the next generation of military
technology, autonomous systems. It outlines some legal and ethical dilemmas the latter pose, and
in particular aspects of the technology that make it dehumanizing. Autonomous systems share all
of these attributes with nuclear weapons. This fact should be encouraging, because the
dehumanizing effects of nuclear systems have been overcome. Drawing on the evolution of nuclear
strategy and the nuclear taboo, I argue that, in negotiating the legal and ethical dilemmas posed
by autonomous weapons systems, the role of international law and of normative entrepreneurs will
be primarily one of imagination, not regulation. The first and most important task is to create
focal points in popular and elite consciousness. To this end, I make three modest suggestions for
normative entrepreneurs: to take political incentives seriously, including the impossibility of
abolition or non-use; to first establish simple, guiding ideas accessible to a broad population before
turning to finer points of law; and to focus on interstate, rather than transnational, cooperation.
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AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND DEHUMANIZED VIOLENCE

The central ethical problem of autonomous weapons is
dehumanized violence. The threats they present to innocent lives, the
gaps they interpose between decisionmakers and actual violence, and
the cold rationality of their deployment, are all moral dilemmas on a
scale militaries have rarely seen. So pronounced is this problem, that
some scholars and public intellectuals have advocated for the total
abolition of these weapons.
Autonomous systems are a product of modern technology, yet
the focus on their strangeness or novelty obscures the most important
part of the problem they present: we have faced it before. Nuclear
weapons and nuclear strategy share all the problems that make
autonomous systems dehumanizing. In fact, they confronted modern
societies with the same problems on an even greater scale.
Encouragingly, these problems were, by and large, overcome.
If the history of nuclear strategy is any guide, the problem of
dehumanization will not be met by changing the weapons themselves,
nor through their abolition. Technology is not the answer. Instead, the
re-humanization of autonomous systems will come through
imagination. Through devices like narrative journalism, speculative
2
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fiction, and public awareness campaigns, normative and legal
entrepreneurs can restore a human dimension to their moral calculus
without undercutting the strategic logic necessary for their successful
use. This approach has clear precedent in international law and
cooperation. It is essentially a solution of imagination.
The history of nuclear strategy teaches a second lesson: the role
of imagination must proceed from, and not replace, the same
rationality, distance, and abstraction that dehumanized violence in the
first place. Put another way, the dehumanizing aspects of autonomous
systems are inescapable. Humanity is retained (or restored) to these
systems, not by doing away with their dehumanizing character, but by
pairing it with something more.
Both lessons derive from the application of game theory to
human conflict. Before developing these lessons, though, this article
first reviews the reasons scholars, philosophers, policymakers, and
journalists are worried by autonomous weapons.
A. How Autonomous Systems Dehumanize Violence
Dehumanized violence is a particularly common problem in
the modern world. In a famous passage, Hannah Arendt captures its
danger while describing the trial of Adolf Eichmann, a Nazi officer in
the SS:
Eichmann was not Iago and not Macbeth . . . Except
for an extraordinary diligence in looking out for his
personal advancement, he had no motives at all . . . He
merely, to put the matter colloquially, never realized
what he was doing . . . such remoteness from reality
and such thoughtlessness can wreak more havoc than
all the evil instincts taken together which, perhaps, are
inherent in man.1

HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN
BANALITY OF EVIL (1963).
1
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The problem, Arendt relates, was not that Eichmann thought
of others as monsters, but that he did not think of them at all. His
world, and his victims, had been thoroughly dehumanized.
1. Civilian Casualties
At least four qualities of autonomous systems, when used in
war, tend to dehumanize their violence: harm to noncombatants;
distance from actual killing; abstraction of human targets; and
automation of life-and-death decisions. The most common critique of
autonomous weapons, especially drones, focuses on civilian casualties.
Autonomous weapons’ role in noncombatant deaths in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and especially Yemen attract significant controversy, and
non-profit groups expend substantial resources drawing attention to
the cost in innocent lives. A small minority of scholars have even
argued that, because of their harm to noncombatants, manufacturing
drones is unethical and tantamount to abetting murder.2
When tallying drones’ civilian toll, some think tanks, such as
the New America Foundation, have set the number of non-militant deaths
quite high, between 747 and 1076;3Other organizations, such as the
Bureau for Investigative Journalism, put the figures even higher,4 but
official figures are much lower.5 Ultimately, the opacity with which the
United States conducts these overseas operations make reliable figures
difficult to cite with any degree of certainty.

Edmund F. Byrne, Making Drones to Kill Civilians: Is It Ethical?, 147 J. of Bus.
Ethics 81, 81-93 (2018).
3
NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, AMERICA’S COUNTERTERRORISM WARS:
TRACKING THE UNITED STATES DRONE STRIKES AND OTHER OPERATIONS IN
PAKISTAN, YEMEN, AND SOMALIA (June 2019), https://www.newamerica.org/indepth/americas-counterterrorism-wars/.
4
THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, DRONE WARFARE (June
2019), https://www.thebureauinvestig ates.com/projects/drone-war.
5
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, SUMMARY OF
2016 INFORMATION REGARDING UNITED STATES COUNTERTERRORISM STRIKES
OUTSIDE
AREAS
OF
ACTIVE
HOSTILITIES
(Jan.
19,
2017),
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reportspublications-2017/item/1741-summary-of-information-regarding-u-scounterterrorism-strikes-outside-areas-of-active-hostilities.
2
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Still, there is substantial evidence that drones do not kill civilians
at disproportionate rates from similar weapons.6 Indeed, the rapid
technological advance of these systems has rendered them less
dangerous to innocent lives than more traditional forms of air power.
Nonetheless, because autonomous systems tend to be low-cost, they
could still increase civilian casualties by making decisionmakers more
willing to take violent action.7 Whatever their effects on individual
encounters, it does seem certain that, by decreasing the costs of
engagements, autonomous weapons increase the utility of violent
force, and thus the likelihood policymakers use it.
2. Distance
Second, autonomous systems often place humans at a
significant distance from actual killing. This distance can make it
difficult for remote pilots (or for the machines themselves) to
distinguish combatants from non-combatants.8 Consequently, some
philosophers and legal theorists have argued for deliberately reducing
this distance, even if that means endangering one’s own soldiers.9 As
well, the relative safety of one side can blur the moral distinction
between warfare and policing. If soldiers are not at risk, are they really
soldiers anymore?10 Less obviously, but no less dangerously, this
distance can make human decisionmakers less aware of others’
humanity. Removed from the circumstances of a decision,
decisionmakers may not fully recognize or appreciate the decision’s
imperatives. This distance can weaken human agents’ ability to employ
moral reasoning or even undermine their sense of responsibility.11

Vivek Sehrawat, Legal Status of Drones Under LOAC and International Law, 5
PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 164, 168-70 (2017).
7
The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing: Hearing
Before the S. Judiciary Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights, 113th
Cong. 12-14 (2013) (statement of Prof. Rosa Brooks).
8
ALEX J. BELLAMY, JUST WARS: FROM CICERO TO IRAQ 182 (2006).
9
MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 156 (2015).
10
Paul W. Kahn, War and Sacrifice in Kosovo, 19 PHIL. AND PUB. POL’Y 1, 2
(1999).
11
P. M. Asaro, Remote-Control Crimes, 18 IEEE ROBOTICS AUTOMATION
MAG. 68, 68-69 (2011).
6
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As above, it is not clear that the distance autonomous systems
create between human operators and military targets actually imperils
civilians, at least not any more than similar weapons. In theory, drones
and related technology can actually create much more accurate
depictions of military targets than traditional artillery or manned
bombers,12 though whether practice lives up to this potential is unclear.
Yet even if it does, the moral distance still exists. At root, the
dehumanizing power of distance stems from its impairment of moral
intuition, and this seems inherent in the technology.
3. Abstraction
Similar to distance, autonomous systems make human targets
abstract. At best, the human image may be filtered through screens; at
worst, it is never observed at all. Popular-press articles often translate
this by saying war becomes “like a video game,”13 but the problem does
not need to be so stylized.14 By removing the human face, or by
encountering the human image in a virtual or other strange
environment,15 abstracting from actual human beings increases an

Christian Enemark, Unmanned Drones and the Ethics of War, in ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF ETHICS AND WAR: JUST WAR IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 332
(Nicholas G. Evans, Fritz Allhof, and Adam Henscke eds., 2013).
13
Noah Shachtman, Drone School: A Ground’s-Eye View, WIRED MAG. (May
27, 2005), https://www.wired.com/2005/05/drone-school-a-grounds-eye-view/;
Chris Cole, Mary Dobbing, and Amy Hallwood, Convenient Killing: Armed Drones and
the
‘Playstation’
Mentality
(Sept.
2010),
https://dronewarsuk.files.wordpress.com/2010/10/conv-killing-final.pdf.
14
In fact, some journalists have challenged this idea, arguing that drone
pilots experience more graphic violence than other soldiers. Eyal Press, The Wounds of
the
Drone
Warrior,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
13,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/13/magazine/veterans-ptsd-drone-warriorwounds.html; Sarah McCammon, The Warfare May Be Remote But the Trauma is Real,
NAT’L
PUB.
RADIO
(Apr.
24,
2017,
2:40
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2017/04/24/525413427/for-drone-pilots-warfare-may-beremote-but-the-trauma-is-real.
15
A related point is developed in the controversial book Barbed Wire, which
argues the widespread use of barbed wire before WWII helped Nazi concentration
camps see their victims as “mere biological objects.” Reviel Netz, Barbed Wire: An
Ecology of Modernity 153 (2004).
12
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individual’s willingness to commit violence and impairs their moral
judgment.16
From the perspective of Christian ethics, this tendency is
particularly troubling. A human being can recognize another’s dignity
because he can recognize the image of God.17The more abstractly he
sees another human being, the less he perceives this image, and so the
less he perceives another’s inherent worth.18
In addition to soldiers, this abstraction afflicts the wider public.
It can make war more likely: “People are more likely to support the use
of force as long as they view it as costless.”19 It can also incur unseen
strategic costs, especially if its victims respond against their
dehumanization.20 The dehumanization of targets can foment
terrorism, instability, and general animosity—in short, autonomous
systems can create as many enemies as they kill. Indeed, the abstract,
dehumanizing effects on the public may be the most important costs
of all. Scholars have repeatedly shown that the experience of war
disinclines a decisionmaker from using any kind of force.21 The most
”By removing warriors completely from risk and fear, unmanned systems
create the first complete break in the ancient connection that defines warriors and
their soldierly values . . . toward ‘virtueless war,’ a result of remote soldiers’ no longer
having any ‘emotional connectivity with the battlespace.”‘ Peter Warren Singer,
Wired For War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century 332 (2009).
17
David H. Calhoun, Human Exceptionalism and the Imago Dei, in HUMAN
DIGNITY IN BIOETHICS: FROM WORLDVIEWS TO THE PUBLIC SQUARE 20 (Stephen
Dilley and Nathan J. Palpant eds. 2013).
18
Perversely, at the same time that human operators are less perceptive of
another’s person, the machine itself may be hyper-personalized. Charles J. Dunlap,
Jr., The Hyper-Personalization of War: Cyber, Big Data, and the Changing Face of Conflict, 15
GEO. J. OF INT’L AFF. 108, 112-13 (2014).
19
Singer, supra note 17, at 316; Stephan Sonnenberg, Why Drones Are
Different, in PREVENTIVE FORCE: DRONES, TARGETED KILLING, AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WARFARE 123-29 (Kerstin Fisk and Jennifer M. Ramos eds.
2016).
20
Michael J. Boyle, The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare, 89 INT’L AFF.
1, 14-16 (2013).
21
. “It may surprise some, but those in the armed forces-especially those
who have seen the horrific consequences of war firsthand-are often the ones most
opposed to the use of force.” Charles Dunlap, Jr., Clever or Clueless? Observations About
Bombing Norm Debates, in THE AMERICAN WAY OF BOMBING: CHANGING ETHICAL
16
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dangerous dehumanization, then, might be occurring in the minds of
a public that never sees, hears, or reads about violence inflicted by
autonomous weapons—a trend exacerbated by the growing
disconnect between soldiers and citizens.22
4. Automation
Finally, by definition autonomous systems remove decisions
from human control. Indeed, it seems likely, even inevitable, that
future systems will leave computers with the final decision to use lethal
force. The increasing speed at which autonomous military instruments
need to make decisions will compel greater and greater leeway given to
machines. Yet even before that bridge is crossed, autonomous systems
pose an important question: who is responsible for their decisions?
In terms of both international law and just war theory, some
scholars fear that autonomous weapons, especially ones making lifeand-death decisions, will force a retreat from jus in bello (justice during
war) to jus ad bellum (justice in going to war) when evaluating the justice
or injustice of a past action.23 The former encompasses the evolution
of norms and laws to govern which actions soldiers can (and cannot)
take during armed conflict; the latter only describes those
circumstances in which an actor may legitimately go to war. For many
reasons dangerous, this retreat from jus in bello to jus ad bello would be
especially troubling because the legal and ethical protections of
noncombatants flow primarily through the former, not the latter. In
short, the fear is that autonomous systems will push legal and ethical
norms towards a laissez-faire approach in which the primary criterion
for just warfare is simply whether the war was begun for a just reason.

LEGAL NORMS, FROM FLYING FORTRESSES TO DRONES 126 (Matthew A.
Evangelista and Henry Shue eds. 2014). Beyond anecdote, this finding is robustly
confirmed by, for instance, Michael C. Horowitz and Allan C. Stam, How Prior
Military Experience Influences the Future Militarized Behavior of Leaders, 68 INT’L ORGS.
527, 527-59 (2014).
22
WARRIORS AND CITIZENS: AMERICAN VIEWS OF OUR MILITARY 1-5 (Jim
Mattis and Kori Schake eds. 2016).
23
Heather M. Roff, Killing in War, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ETHICS
AND WAR: JUST WAR THEORY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 353 (Nicholas G.
Evans, Fritz Allhoff, and Adam Henschke eds. 2013).
AND
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B. Comparing Nuclear and Autonomous Weapons
In some ways, humans have encountered these problems since
ancient times. Distance inheres in any sort of ranged weapon, as does
abstraction; crude traps and urban sieges involve a form of automatic
death; and civilian casualties are as old as war. Perhaps the inventor of
the sling and stone wrestled with the same moral quandaries we are
debating now.24 Yet autonomous systems, especially drones, seem to
take the problem a step further. While the difference may be one of
degree, not of kind, it is still enormous.
But there is another field where these problems loomed even
larger: nuclear strategy. Nuclear weapons are distant: intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) long predate the first drone pilots operating
behind air-conditioned desks in Nevada. Civilian casualties remained
an inescapable part of nuclear weaponry from its inception. However
deadly autonomous systems become, and however remotely
controlled, they will never rival the intercontinental extinction of
unarmed millions.
Still more similar is the way violence becomes automatic.
Nuclear strategists considered automatic responses a feature, not a
bug. Policymakers sought “trip-wires”25 that would automatically
commit them to military, even nuclear, responses.26 They coined new
jargon to describe this desired attribute: automaticity.27 In nuclear
bargaining, a leader who could credibly surrender his freedom of
choice gained enormous leverage, because a nuclear system that would

24
Medieval longbowmen “need have no sense of initiating an act of killing,
therefore; it was probably their technical and professional sense which was most
actively engaged.” JOHN KEEGAN, THE FACE OF BATTLE: A STUDY OF
AGINCOURT, WATERLOO, AND THE SOMME 93 (1976).
25
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE 47 (1966).
26
American policy still relies on trip-wires today. For a recent study on their
continued role, see A. Lanoszka and M.A. Hunzeker, Landpower and American
Credibility, 45 PARAMETERS: THE U. S. ARMY’S SENIOR PROF. J. 17, 17-26 (2016).
27
See Schelling, supra note 26, at 50 n. 9.
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respond automatically to an enemy’s aggression was the strongest
possible deterrent.28
Perhaps most of all, nuclear strategy was dehumanized because
of its abstraction. Except for the bombings of Japan, potential civilian
deaths from nuclear weapons were and remain hypothetical. Anodyne
words like “counter-value” concealed strategies that targeted
noncombatants in the millions. And the whole subject was studied by
economists and civilian strategists, often with mathematical tools that
reduced human beings to numbers on a chalkboard.
Because we have encountered the same problems before, and
on a much more frightening scale, it will be instructive to examine how
we solved them in the past. While they may not translate precisely,
these solutions, one hopes, can help us navigate the coming era of
remote-controlled warfare and “killer robots.”
II. GAME THEORY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND DEHUMANIZED
VIOLENCE
The novelty of nuclear weapons demanded a new kind of
military strategy. Bernard Brodie, a military thinker later celebrated for
his commentary on Clausewitz, became the first to theorize the bomb
in The Absolute Weapon.29 A bevy of academics soon joined him; they
became known as “defense intellectuals.” As these strategists gained
prominence among policymakers and in the public eye, they came
under increasing fire. Their critics, aghast at their willingness to debate

Thomas C. Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining, 46 THE AM. ECON. REV.
281, 281-306 (1956). This ideal was famously satirized in Stanley Kubrick’s Dr.
Strangelove, which imagined a Soviet weapon, the Doomsday Machine, that would
automatically destroy the entire world if any atomic device were detonated. DR.
STRANGELOVE, OR, HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE THE BOMB
(Columbia TriStar Home Entertainment 1964). See also Charles Maland, Dr.
Strangelove (1964): Nightmare Comedy and the Ideology of Liberal Consensus, 31 AM. Q. 697,
697-717 (1979); PETER DANIEL SMITH, DOOMSDAY MEN: THE REAL DR.
STRANGELOVE AND THE DREAM OF THE SUPERWEAPON (2007).
29
BERNARD BRODIE ET AL., THE ABSOLUTE WEAPON: ATOMIC POWER
AND WORLD ORDER (1964); BERNARD BRODIE, STRATEGY IN THE MISSILE AGE
(1959).
28

10

Lessons From Game Theory About Humanizing Next-Generation Weapons

the pros and cons of mass death, recoiled in horror. Herman Kahn,
whose manner and appearance could give the impression of an almost
gleefully cynical detachment, attracted the most ire, but all experienced
a similar opprobrium.30 Academics and peace activists condemned the
cool, abstract way these civilian intellectuals tallied human casualties.
Detached analysis, argued academics and activists, was no way to study
the prospect of nuclear annihilation.
A microcosm of this conflict is that between Thomas Schelling
and Anatol Rapaport. Their disagreement is especially telling, since
they focused on the most abstract and dehumanized of all the nuclear
strategist’s tools: game theory. In particular, they disagreed about
whether this mathematical tool, in which both were experts, should be
applied to nuclear strategy.
A. Should Nuclear Strategy Use Game Theory?
Game theory uses formal, mathematical logic to study
problems of strategic interaction. It typically assumes some sort of
rationality among actors. As a subfield of the larger rational-choice
tradition, game theory’s picture of the world is a limited one, but its
practitioners hope (they place a “methodological bet”)31 that what it
ignores will be less important than what it reveals.
In the 1950s and 1960s, game theory achieved prominence for
its applications to nuclear bargaining. Thomas Schelling, who went on
to win the Nobel Prize, exemplified this approach. A Harvard
economist, Schelling began his career working on foreign aid (he
helped administer the Marshall Plan), and his exposure to international
politics quickly led him to the study of nuclear strategy. In major
Kahn’s influence and demeanor can still repel strategic thinkers (Andrew
Bacevich calls him “creepy” in the popular press). One scholarly monograph made
this judgment on his Thermonuclear War: it “is a massive window into a warped mind.”
Andrew Bacevich, Rationalizing Lunacy: The Intellectual as Servant of the State, Huffington
Post
(Dec.
6,
2017),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/rationalizinglunacy_b_6828460; David A. Baldwin, Andrew J. Bacevich, ed., The Long War: A New
History of U.S. National Security Policy Since World War II, 10 J. of Cold War Stud. 149,
149-151 (2008).
31
DAVID A. LAKE AND ROBERT POWELL, STRATEGIC CHOICE AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 16 (1999).
30
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contributions to the budding field, he showed how the logic of nuclear
bargaining did not differ substantially from that of mafia protection
rackets; he elaborated the idea of commitment devices (like trip-wires)
to stabilize international politics between the superpowers; and he
analyzed “salami tactics” and explained how the United States could
prevent their abuse. Perhaps most importantly, Schelling was the first
strategist to recognize and explain how nuclear weapons could increase
American bargaining leverage even when the States could not credibly
threaten to use them. By engaging in a “competition in risk-taking,”
the United States could compel an adversary to back down by
increasing the risk of mutual disaster—even though neither side
actually wanted the disaster to happen.32 Schelling articulated all of
these ideas in readable, analytic prose, feeling as free to discuss mass
death as coercive parenting strategies. A famous quip epitomizes this
style: “Against defenseless people there is not much that nuclear
weapons can do that cannot be done with an ice pick.”33
Schelling’s cold approach met with heated criticism. Anatol
Rapaport, himself a game theorist,34 denounced Schelling for applying
math to nuclear strategy. Rapaport felt that, as a tool, game theory
should be applied only with great caution to human behavior, and
never to the Cold War arms race. He pointed out that, as a branch of
mathematics, game theory necessarily dehumanized its subjects.35
Between strategy and conscience, there is an “essential
incompatibility,” he argued:
Seduction lurks also in the mental habit of rational
analysis. For this analysis requires detachment. While
detachment is a source of supreme strength in the
investigation of nature, it may be debilitating if it is
Schelling, supra note 26, at 91.
Id. at 19.
34
Rapaport is perhaps most famous for his victories in Robert Axelrod’s
“tournaments,” which pitted competitors’ strategies against each other in repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemmas. Rapaport won with the simple strategy of tit-for-tat. ROBERT
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 42 (1984).
35
”Mathematics is a great leveler. When a problem is mathematically
formulated, its content has disappeared and only the form has remained. To the
strategists ‘targets’ are indeed only circles on maps; overkill is a coefficient.” ANATOL
RAPAPORT, STRATEGY AND CONSCIENCE 192 (1964).
32
33
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carried over bodily from natural science . . . One
cannot play chess if one becomes aware of the pieces
as living souls.36
In a review of Rapaport’s book, Schelling objected to this line
of reasoning which alleged “strategic thinking is bad no matter how
good it is.”37 He criticized Rapaport for disagreeing, not with his logic,
but with its coldness. In a matter as cataclysmic as nuclear armageddon,
cool heads would seem to be in demand. Nonetheless, Schelling
recognized that his disagreement with Rapaport was a normative one,
not a scientific one, and he left it to others to decide who was right.
By any measure, Rapaport and figures like him lost the debate
about game theory and nuclear strategy. Schelling remains the classic
text on the subject, assigned in policy schools around the country,
while Rapaport’s objections have passed out of print. One scholar
wrote that Schelling “has contributed as much as and perhaps more
than any other thinker of the scientific genre to the theory of
international relations.”38 It is no overstatement to say that Schelling
gave strategists and policymakers the intellectual framework they still
use today to think about nuclear weapons.39
Perhaps the best explanation for Schelling’s victory comes
from Hedley Bull. Bull was an acerbic critic of modern social science,
and his works came to found the so-called English School of
international relations against the American combination of
positivism, mathematics, and hypothesis-testing. Yet, despite his
antipathy for applying science to human beings, Bull nonetheless sided
with the defense intellectuals against Rapaport. He observed, “[there
are] certain conflicts in the world that simply have to be taken as

Id. at 109, 195.
Thomas C. Schelling, Book Review, 54 THE AM. ECON. REV. 1082, 1088
(1964) (reviewing ANATOL RAPAPORT, STRATEGY AND CONSCIENCE (1964)).
38
Hedley Bull, International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach, 18 WORLD
POL. 361, 368 (1966).
39
Robert Ayson, Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age: Strategy as Social
Science (2004). The only full-length treatment of Schelling, his thought, and its
influence. While unfairly critical in places, and overly obsessive with the concept of
stability throughout, it is a helpful companion to Schelling’s corpus.
36
37
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given,”40 and he faulted Rapaport for never showing where a less
rational, more “conscientious” approach to nuclear strategy produced
better outcomes.41 Whatever the objections to applying mathematics to
human beings, analytic detachment is not one of them. Bull concluded:
When one asks oneself what the history of strategic
policy in the West might have been in the last ten years
had this influence not been brought to bear, or when
one contemplates the moral and intellectual poverty of
the debate about nuclear affairs (or of that part of it we
are able to see) in the Soviet Union where in fact no
such influence exists, it is difficult to escape the
conclusion that even though the civilian strategists
have sometimes committed the errors I have been
exploring, they have served us well.42
Rapaport claimed that strategists cannot play chess with living
souls. And yet, of course, they do. Strategists do because they must.43
He was right that abstract analysis was dehumanizing, in the same way
that autonomous systems are dehumanizing today. Yet he was wrong
to see this objection as final. The answer to the question, “is
abstraction dehumanizing,” must be an unequivocal yes. But that
answer does not imply it should not be done. A lesson emerges from
the history of nuclear strategy: when the stakes are high, rational
40

Hedley Bull, Strategic Studies and Its Critics, 20 World Pol. 593, 604 (1968).

41
As another reviewer pointed out, “Ideologies are sometimes filled out with
a complement of new and liberating conceptions, but rarely by ‘ideological
disarmament.”‘ Arthur Lee Burns, Must Strategy and Conscience Be Disjoined?, 17 World
Pol. 687, 688 (1965) (reviewing Anatol Rapaport, Strategy and Conscience (1964)).
42
Bull, supra note 41, at 605
43
Kahn opens the first chapter of Thinking About the Unthinkable with this
observation: Seventy-five years ago white slavery was rampant in England. Each year
thousands of young girls were forced into brothels and kept there against their will
. . . One reason why this lasted as long as it did was that it could not be talked about
openly in Victorian England; moral standards as to subjects of discussion made it
difficult to arouse the community to necessary action.” HERMAN KAHN, THINKING
ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE 17 (1962).
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analysis—no matter how cold and detached—ought not and will not
be discarded.
Raymond Aron, in his introduction to Kahn’s Thinking About
the Unthinkable, summarizes the issue well. He writes:
The analyst who calculates in millions or tens of
millions of deaths resulting in a matter of a few minutes
or a few hours resulting from thermonuclear
exchanges does indeed forget the human significance
of these figures . . . without the ability to neutralize his
feelings, the analyst’s profession would become
impossible. But the acquired capacity to coldly examine
possible horrors does not prove the analyst has lost his
humanity.44
Aron is correct, yet he leaves the most important question
unanswered. If calculating in the abstract millions is dehumanizing, but
the analyst has not lost his humanity, then what rehumanized the
process? The answer to this question also arises from game theory: by
navigating multiple equilibria with the moral imagination.
B. The Problem of Multiple Equilibria
According to Harrison Wagner, there are two fundamental
insights of game theory. First is the problem of strategic
interdependence, i.e. that one actor’s interests depend on other actors’
choices. Second is the problem of multiple equilibria, i.e. that many
different outcomes are rationally possible.45
Consider an example. Scholars of international politics often
discuss a simple game called a Stag Hunt.46 In this game, two hunters

44
Raymond Aron, Introduction to HERMAN KAHN, THINKING ABOUT THE
UNTHINKABLE 10 (1962).
45
R. HARRISON WAGNER, WAR AND THE STATE: THE THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 101 (2007).
46
Kenneth Waltz seems to have introduced this game to the study of
international relations, drawing on a famous vignette by Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
KENNETH N. WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE AND WAR: A THEORETICAl ANALYSIS
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go into the woods in pursuit of the evening’s dinner. Their best
outcome is to hunt a stag together, in which case they will feast on
venison. However, either one of them can also choose to chase a rabbit
on his own, in which case he will catch the rabbit and have a satisfying
but meager meal, while the other huntsman (if he still pursues the stag)
will go hungry. This game is summarized in the table below.
Hunter 2

Hunter 1

Stag

Rabbit

Stag

3,3

0,1

Rabbit

1,0

1,1

The first insight of game theory, strategic interdependence,
highlights how one hunter’s decision hinges on what he expects the
other hunter will do. It further guarantees that there are only two
possible outcomes: either both hunt the stag, or both hunt rabbits.
Anything else is not stable—not an “equilibrium,” in the parlance of
game theory—because at least one hunter would prefer to change his
behavior to achieve a better outcome.47 For instance, if Hunter 1
chased a rabbit, but Hunter 2 chased the stag, then Hunter 2 would
deviate to chasing rabbits. Thus, strategic interdependence helps
eliminate a variety of outcomes as implausible because reasonable
agents would not behave in such a way, at least not for any sustained
period of time.48

(1954); For an important recent application of this game to state formation, see BRIAN
SKYRMS, THE STAG HUNT AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE (2004).
47
A third, mixed-strategy equilibrium exists, in which each hunter pursues
the stag or the rabbit probabilistically. For ease of exposition, I ignore this possibility
here.
48
Thus, game theory refuses the postmodern or constructivist idea that the
world can be whatever “states make of it.” ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY
OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999).
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The second fundamental insight, multiple equilibria, stresses
that, once implausible outcomes are eliminated, there remain many
ways for the world to turn out. The Stag Hunt, though a simple game,
has many possible outcomes. This multiplicity confronts both the
theorist and the practitioner with a problem. Because the theorist seeks
to predict outcomes, he must find ways to refine the number of
possible equilibria; otherwise, he can offer no clear hypotheses to test.
The theorist therefore turns to cultural norms and expectations in
order to discern which outcomes are likely to occur in his own
circumstances. To return to the Stag Hunt: if there are two possible
equilibria, either both hunting the stag or both chasing rabbits, then
the theorist must discern whether his society is one in which the
hunters trust each other enough to hunt the stag. The practitioner faces
a similar problem: because she likely finds herself in an unsatisfying
equilibrium, she must devise ways to move from a less-desirable
outcome to a more-desirable one. To put all this more simply, the
problem of multiple equilibria is identical to the classic questions,
“which of the possible worlds do we inhabit, which do we wish to
inhabit, and how can we move from one to the other?” Game theory
does not erase these idealistic questions; its importance is in stressing
that imagination and idealism must be framed within the incentive
structures of the relevant agents.
In the Stag Hunt, the problem of multiple equilibria is easily
solved. Even if the two hunters are used to chasing rabbits, they can
coordinate with relative ease to start hunting stags. But imagine a far
more complex hunt, with thousands of hunters, hundreds of options,
and uncountably many competing interests. How could human beings
navigate this complexity? The answer is surprisingly simple: they look
for a focal point.
C. Focal Points as a Solution to Multiple Equilibria
Thomas Schelling was among the first to think seriously about
the problem of multiple equilibria. He addressed it with a novel
solution: the idea of a focal point.49 A focal point is an outcome which

Thomas C. Schelling, Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War, 1
CONFLICT RESOL. 19, 21 (1957).
49

17

2020

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

Symposium Issue

“stands out,” which attracts the actors’ attention, and by so doing
makes coordination easier. Schelling popularized this idea with an
intuitive example. Imagine two strangers: each is given a photograph
of the other and told to meet that person at noon in New York City.
They have no other information. Can they do it? Schelling’s surprising
answer was, yes: both will probably go to Grand Central Station, or
maybe Times Square.50 These hubs are focal points: popularized by
movies, books, and television, they stand out in the public imagination
as spots unlike the others.
Other examples could include avoiding bicycle collisions by
intuitively swerving right51or (if they have droll senses of humor) a
husband and wife, separated in a department store, looking for each
other at the lost-and-found. In these examples, thousands of possible
equilibria exist. Cooperation emerges because both actors intuit a
pattern of behavior that, for reasons either inherent or cultural, stands
out from all the others—even though others could be perfectly
“rational” or “reasonable.”
The use of focal points is particularly important with tacit
bargaining, where much must go unsaid. Tacit bargaining happens on
a vast scale, as among millions of citizens who cannot possibly all talk
to each other, and on a small scale, as among world leaders who cannot
say or communicate everything they might wish. Drivers negotiating a
poorly marked intersection are engaging in tacit bargaining (especially
if one is more aggressive than the other); world leaders maneuvering
carrier groups into a strategic waterway are doing the same thing.
Indeed, an emerging consensus in political science sees state
development as a kind of massive, unspoken bargain between rulers
and ruled.52 In these situations, because it is impossible to explicitly
coordinate action, the implicit appeal of focal points becomes
decisively important.

Id.
PRESH TALWALKAR, THE JOY OF GAME THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION
TO STRATEGIC THINKING 26-8 (2014).
52
Wagner, supra note 46; Charles Tilley, Coercion, Capital, and European States,
AD 990-1990 in COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE, CONTENTIOUS POLITICS, AND SOCIAL
CHANGE 140-54 (2017).
50
51
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Since Schelling, the study of focal points has progressed,
though not primarily within game theory.53 (He once observed, “Focal
points have done more for the theory of games, than game theory has
done for the theory of focal points.”)54 Instead, the concept opened an
avenue for normative and sociological approaches to intersect rational,
economic thinking:55 “here ideas contribute to outcomes in the absence
of a unique equilibrium.”56 By studying which ideas gain salience, a
social scientist can distinguish between multiple equilibria. This
continued a research agenda Schelling envisioned, one in which game
theory would illuminate which social conventions can (and cannot)
come about and how durable they might be once they emerged.57
D. Focal Points as Re-Humanizing
The practice of identifying focal points is empathetic and
deeply humane. It requires an observer to put himself, not just in
someone else’s rational position, but in their emotional, cultural, and
religious shoes, as well. He must get inside their heads and their hearts.
Identifying focal points is an exercise of moral imagination.
Unlike a rationalistic approach that would try to trace
everything to first principles, moral imagination begins by situating
oneself in particular cultural and historical circumstances. (The phrase
“moral imagination” is due to Edmund Burke, who was arguing against
the excessive rationalism of the French Revolution.)58 In this, it
53
For an exception, see the work of Robert Sugden, who studies focal points
rigorously within mathematical game theory. Robert Sugden, A Theory of Focal Points,
105 THE ECON. J. 533, 533-50 (1995).
54
Jean-Paul Carvalho, An Interview with Thomas Schelling, 2 OXONOMICS 1,4
(2007).
55
Albert S. Yee, Thick Rationality and the Missing Brute Fact: The Limits of
Rationalist Incorporations of Norms and Ideas, 59 THE J. OF POL. 1001, 1001-39 (1997).
56
IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS, AND POLITICAL
CHANGE 12 (Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993).
57
In fact, Schelling believed that David Lewis, the eminent philosopher of
conventions, took his main idea from Schelling’s course on bargaining, where Lewis
had been his student. N. Emrah Aydinonat, An Interview with Thomas C. Schelling:
Interpretation of Game Theory and the Checkerboard Model, 2 ECON. BULL. 1, 3 (2005).
58
”By this ‘moral imagination,’ Burke signifies that power of ethical
perception which strides beyond the barriers of private experience and momentary
events.” RUSSELL KIRK, REDEEMING THE TIME 71 (1996).
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resembles the moral philosophy of Adam Smith and his modern heirs,
who emphasize a kind of empathy as requisite to just reasoning.59 Thus,
through focal points, strategic reasoning not only involves but comes
to demand a moral vision, one shared with other human beings.
Schelling himself emphasized the role of ethical imagination.
Finding a focal point, he argued, may “depend on imagination more
than on logic; it may depend on analogy, precedent, accidental
arrangement, symmetry, aesthetic or geometric configuration . . . Poets
may do better than logicians at this game.”60 In fact, Schelling valued
the role of imaginative boundaries so highly that he favored them even
when they might cut against short-term bargaining power.61 Because
states and culture are themselves a kind of “tacit bargain,” the ethical
norms that evolve in them encapsulate how individuals are
coordinating between multiple equilibria.62
Through this evolutionary process of moral coordination
around a focal point, nuclear weapons became re-humanized. That is,
not the technology nor its deployment, but the imaginative ways the
larger culture came to conceive it, restored a degree of humanity to
nuclear strategy. So complete has this ethical evolution been, that some
scholars argue the memory of Hiroshima has been “sanctified” in the
public imagination.63 This process is most clearly seen in the nuclear
taboo.

ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (D.D. Raphael and
A.L. Macfie eds. 1976). It is worth noting that Smith is tracking a divide between
reason and sentiment and inquiring which one offers the wellspring of moral judgment.
“For Smith, the key mechanism of sympathy is imaginatively placing oneself in
another’s position, or what would now be called simulation.” Antti Kauppinen,
MORAL SENTIMENTALISM, IN THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 1
(Edward Zalta ed. 2018).
60
Thomas C. Schelling, War Without Pain, and Other Models, 15 WORLD POL.
465 (1963).
61
Alexander Field, Schelling, von Neumann, and the Event that Didn’t Occur, 5
GAMES 53, 70 (2014).
62
Thomas C. Schelling, Game Theory and the Study of Ethical Systems, 12 J. OF
CONFLICT RESOL. 34, 34-44 (1968).
63
Alvin M. Weinberg, The Bell and the Bomb, COSMOS J. (1997).
59
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The nuclear taboo is the international norm against the use of
any nuclear weapon for any purpose. The taboo draws a distinction
between nuclear and other weapons, and its prohibition on the former
is total. How it arose through an interplay of strategic thought and
moral imagination is well summarized by Nina Tannenwald:
Game theorists hold that norms can serve as focal
points, thus contributing to stable outcomes in the
absence of a unique equilibrium. The analysis here
helps to explain why one equilibrium was chosen over
another. The development of the taboo has been the
result of both self-interested and normative concerns,
and has depended importantly on discursive
strategies—–how
nuclear
weapons
became
64
categorized, interpreted, and politicized.
We take for granted that nuclear weapons and conventional
weapons are qualitatively different from each other. Yet this distinction
is arbitrary: “the line between conventional and nuclear weapons did
not always exist but had to be created.”65 After all, today some nuclear
weapons are less powerful than some conventional ones, and yet while
the United States has periodically used the latter, it has never again
used the former—despite strong temptation otherwise.66 Moreover,
the taboo is not a matter of law, since the use of nuclear weapons is not
legally prohibited.67 Furthermore, the distinction certainly was not
inevitable: many early Cold Warriors, including Secretary Dulles,
expected they would eventually by treated as ordinary weapons not
unlike any others.68

Nina Tannenwald, Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo, 29
INT’L SECURITY 5, 41 (2005).
65
Id. at 12.
66
Thomas C. Schelling, An Astonishing Sixty Years: The Legal of Hiroshima, 96
AM. ECON. REV. 929, 931-2 (2006).
67
The United States has never agreed to any general prohibition, and in fact
has vetoed such proposals. See also Michael N. Schmitt, The International Court of Justice
and the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 51 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 91, 91-116 (1998); Dale
Stephens, Human Rights and Armed Conflict: The Advisory Opinion of the International Court
of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons Case, 4 YALE HUM. RTS. AND DEV. L. J. 1, 1 (2001).
68
Tannenwald, supra note 65, at 5.
64
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It seems clear that, without this artificial convention, nuclear
weapons likely would have been used sometime in the past sixty
years.69 Yet, “[a]lthough rationalist variables are important, the taboo
cannot be explained simply as the straightforward result of rational
adaptation to strategic circumstances.”70 Instead, it emerged through a
normative evolution propagated by activists, novelists, and public
discourse. This evolution exerted increasing pressure on policymakers,
constraining them within the moral dimensions in which the public
saw nuclear force.71 In fact, many advances in military technology were
explicitly passed over by policymakers, for fear of eroding the
distinction between nuclear and other weapons. (Similarly, PNEs—
peaceful nuclear explosions, whose use was proposed for large-scale
construction projects like canals—also became taboo.)72
Thomas Schelling dedicated his Nobel acceptance speech to
this theme. He said:
A large part of the credit for nuclear weapons not
having been used must be due to the “taboo” that
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles perceived to have
been attached to these weapons as early as 1953 . . .
These weapons are unique, and a large part of their
uniqueness derives from their being perceived as unique.
We call most other weapons “conventional,” and that
word has two distinct senses. One is “ordinary,
familiar, traditional,” words that can be applied to
food, clothing, or housing. The more interesting sense
of “conventional” is something that arises as if by
compact, by agreement, by convention. It is simply an
established convention that nuclear weapons are
different.73

69
Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative
Basis of Nuclear Non-Use, 53 Int’l Org. 433, 463 (1999).
70
Tannenwald, supra note 65, at 7.
71
Id. at 23-7.
72
Schelling, supra note 67, at 932.
73
Id. at 929.
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It is striking that Schelling, a game theorist and an economist,
privileges an imaginative convention over rule-making,
institutionalization, or regulation:
We depend on nonproliferation efforts to restrain the
production and deployment of weapons by more and
more countries; we may depend even more on
universally shared inhibitions on nuclear use.
Preserving those inhibitions and extending them, if we
know how to preserve and extend them, to cultures
and national interests that may not currently share
those inhibitions will be a crucial part of our nuclear
policy.74
In short, nuclear weapons became rehumanized through a
normative evolution outside of nuclear strategy. This evolution did not
overwhelm strategic incentives—the campaign for nuclear abolition
never came close to succeeding, and the United States never adopted
a no-first-use policy—but it channeled these strategic decisions within
a moral vision of the world. As a result, international cooperation
emerged within a deeply satisfying ethical framework despite the
fundamentally dehumanizing nature of nuclear weapons, a nature
which to this day remains basically unchanged.
III. FOCAL POINTS, IMAGINATIVE COOPERATION, AND
AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS
If we take the nuclear taboo as a guide, to develop international
norms around autonomous systems, we should take their
dehumanizing aspects as given, and instead seek to rehumanize nuclear
strategy through the popular imagination. This prescription is not far
from that suggested by Sir John Keegan’s seminal The Face of Battle.
There, he stresses the value of a “de-sensitized,” even a
“dehumanizing,” approach to war, one which has helped make
Western militaries the most powerful in the world: “the deliberate

74

Id. at 935.
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injection of emotion into an already highly emotive subject will
seriously hinder, if not indeed altogether defeat, the aim of officertraining . . . [given] that battles are going to happen, it is powerfully
beneficial.”75 Dehumanization is a necessary part of military power. But
Keegan goes on to outline an important role for the military historian,
which is to recapture the ‘realism’ of battle by imbuing its necessarily
abstract components with something of their original life; to rehumanize it: hence his title, the face of battle.76
What Keegan did for battle, John Hersey’s Hiroshima did for
nuclear weapons.77 His son relates: “He told me about getting the idea
of using novelistic devices to structure his reporting. He wanted to put
faces and names to the story . . . He wanted to show their humanity.”78
His approach sets a valuable precedent to follow. If we want to
understand how to talk and write about the effects of autonomous
weapons, his example is a good place to begin.79
A. Examples of Focal Points in International Law
One of the most important facts about the nuclear taboo is
that it is entirely arbitrary. The distinction upon which it rests does not
actually have a basis in any first principles or pure reason. Rather, it is
entirely the result of an ethical evolution. Its moral force, which is
entirely real, flows from norms that are not inherent but have been
Keegan, supra note 25, at 18-21.
In one instructive comparison, he contrasts the historiography of Julius
Caesar, whose “subordinate figures are cardboard,” with that of Thucydides, whose
figures “are individuals, with wills of their own . . .
Thucydides’ army . . . [is] the product of human conduct and character at every level.”
Id. at 68.
77
JOHN HERSEY, HIROSHIMA (1999).
78
Russell Shorto, John Hersey, the Writer Who Let Hiroshima Speak for Itself,
THE
NEW
YORKER
(Aug.
31,
2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/john-hersey-the-writer-wholet-hiroshima-speak-for-itself.
79
Some scholarly efforts have recently been exerted in this direction,
especially by scholars from the liberal arts, but their ponderous execution and
academese have limited their appeal. FROM ABOVE: WAR, VIOLENCE, AND
VERTICALITY (Mark Whitehead, Peter Adey, and Alison Williams eds. 2013). Charles
J. Dunlap, Jr., Book Review: From Above: War, Violence, and Verticality, 44 PARAMETERS
187, 187-89 (2014).
75
76
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created. Early in the Cold War, Schelling and Hedley Bull converged
toward the idea that “‘a common language, a common epistemology
and understanding of the universe, a common religion, a common
ethical code” is necessary for stable cooperation; they differed in that
Schelling believed “norms were much more created than made.”80
Schelling turned out to be right. Before returning to autonomous
systems, it will be useful to briefly consider two other examples where
focal points emerged through the efforts of normative entrepreneurs
to shape international law: the campaign to save the whales, and the
regulation of outer space.
Similar to the nuclear taboo is the legal moratorium on
whaling. The modern norm against whaling is novel; in fact, even in
the 1960s U.S. pilots still used whales for target practice.81 While their
killing was regulated by international bodies, it was seen as an entirely
legitimate practice. Just as nuclear weapons once were considered just
another kind of bomb, so too were whales just another kind of marine
life. During the 1960s and 70s, increasing disagreement about the
proper bounds on whaling made cooperation difficult.
Environmentalists exploited this fissure to create a new focal point for
international norms: zero whaling. The clarity of this idea made it easy
to coordinate the relevant actors, while their opponents could never
create a similarly imaginative focus.82 Once these actors came to
dominate the International Whaling Commission, international law
swiftly followed suit. “They [environmentalists] mobilize for political
action best when an issue can be framed in fairly simple terms
indicating a clear policy preference without the need for a highly
detailed explanation of why the chosen policy is better than others.”83
The moratorium has been in force ever since.

80
Robert Ayson, A Common Interest in Common Interest: Hedley Bull, Thomas
Schelling, and Collaboration in International Politics, in REMEMBERING HEDLEY 56, 61
(Coral Bell and Meredith Thatcher eds. 2008).
81
Mark J. Peterson, Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and the International
Management of Whaling, 46 INT’L ORG. 147, 159 n. 23 (1992).
82
DAVID A. LAKE, JEFFRY A. FRIEDEN, AND KENNETH A. SCHULTZ,
WORLD POLITICS: INTERESTS, INTERACTIONS, INSTITUTIONS 501 (2nd Ed. 2013).
83
Peterson, supra note 82, at 155.
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Perhaps the best example of creating a new focal point is outer
space. Americans take it for granted that space is a sort of commons,
something belonging to all humanity, but this was not obvious when
its exploration first became possible. There were multiple equilibria.
Two of these potential equilibria came to stand out: in one, space
would be treated like airspace, a kind of property divided among
sovereign nations; in the other, it would be treated like the high seas,
navigable to all. Western lawyers, eager for an internationalist vision of
the next frontier, began advancing the analogy of the high seas, and
this became the foundation of international law on the matter.84 To be
sure, there were traditional balance-of-power concerns in the
negotiations; but the legal norms that emerged were essentially
determined by imaginative metaphors, not power politics. We owe the
freedom of space, now a cornerstone of the global economy, to the
imaginative analogies drawn in the early years of the Cold War.85
B. Creating Focal Points for Autonomous Systems
The major obstacle to cooperation around autonomous
systems is the absence of a clear focal point. At present, no
coordination point stands out besides non-use, and unlike with nuclear
weapons or whaling this outcome is not an equilibrium. The problem
is especially pressing, since action needs to be taken before suboptimal
patterns evolve on their own.86The pressure is especially acute for the
United States, who “sets the standard for bombing practices and
remains the focus of efforts to change those practices.”87 The
technology itself, though, is not the problem, but its dehumanizing
effects.88 As with nuclear weapons, we should look for their solution,
not in the technology, but in the way our culture morally imagines it.
To settle disputes over celestial objects and property rights, this analogy
was later combined with one comparing space to Antarctica, whose legal status had
been settled in 1959.
85
M.J. Peterson, The Use of Analogies in Developing Outer Space Law, 51 INT’L
ORG. 245, 245-74 (1997).
86
Brooks, supra note 7, at 14.
87
THE AMERICAN WAY OF BOMBING: CHANGING ETHICAL AND LEGAL
NORMS, FROM FLYING FORTRESSES TO DRONES 2 (Matthew A. Evangelista and
Henry Shue eds. 2014).
88
Patrick Eberle, To UAV or Not to UAV: That is the Question; Here is One
Answer, AIR AND SPACE POWER J. (2001).
84
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In this section, I want to draw three lessons from the previous
discussion of nuclear strategy: begin with incentives; keep it simple;
and start at the top.
1. Begin with Incentives
Cooperation must begin by identifying potential equilibria—
or, put another way, it must begin by studying the relevant incentives.
Once again, it is useful to turn to Thomas Schelling:
As a starting point for legal analysis or moral judgment,
it may be helpful to draw the matrix of choices . . .
Game theory would be most pertinent to those
constraints that affect people’s expectations about each
other . . . And in that process, the difference between
ethics and law, or ethics and instinct, may be less
important than the similarities.89
Imagination is not an excuse to escape reality. Rather,
imagination must begin with what is probable.90 The simplest proposal
for dealing with autonomous weapons is to abolish them or, at the
least, to ban their use.91 This proposal will not succeed. Immediately,
the enormous pressures on democratic leaders to avoid casualties
mean that nonuse92 or abolition is not an option.93 Public support for
drone strikes is strong and, by some polls, overwhelming, especially
when American lives are not at risk; moreover, this support is
Schelling, supra note 63, at 35-6.
Here, my argument tracks that of the philosopher Irving Babbitt. Babbitt
contrasts this approach to imagination with that of Rousseau, who said in his
“Second Discourse,” “Let us begin by setting aside all the facts.” IRVING BABBITT,
DEMOCRACY AND LEADERSHIP 79 (1924).
91
Robert Sparrow, Robots and Respect: Assessing the Case Against Autonomous
Weapon Systems, 30 ETHICS AND INT’L AFF. 93, 93-116 (2016).
92
The nuclear taboo was opposed by major political figures in the 1950s
(including Dwight Eisenhower); but quickly politicians of all parties came to
recognize that, whatever its short-run costs, preventing escalation to nuclear war was
worth the price. This is clearly seen in Lyndon Johnson’s insistence on the qualitative
difference between nuclear and other weapons. Unlike nuclear weapons, with
autonomous ones the public supports their use.
93
Though, in terms of sheer creativity, it’s hard to top the droll. Campaign to
Stop Killer Robots, https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/about-us/.
89
90
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bipartisan.94 So long as capital-rich democracies prefer to lose
expensive machines rather than people—a preference that seems
universal and enduring—autonomous systems will be a fact of modern
war.95
Moreover, given their increasing accuracy and precision, many
observers argue that armed forces have a responsibility to use these new
technologies, especially unmanned vehicles.96 In fact, some legal
scholars argue that international law ought to make their use a positive
duty.97 Far from abolishing them, autonomous systems may be ethically
required of 21st century war.
Another common proposal is Meaningful Human Control
(MHC).98 Unlike abolition, this proposal does not seek to eliminate the
technology but to circumvent the legal and moral dilemmas it poses. It
would require human beings to make the most ethically and legallyfraught decisions, taking these responsibilities away from “killer

The Ap-GfK Poll: A Survey of the American General Population (ages 18+), GFK
PUBLIC
AFF.
AND
CORPORATE
COMM.
(Apr.
2015),
http://surveys.ap.org/data/GfK/AP-GfK Poll April 2015 Topline drones.pdf;
Alyssa Brown and Frank Newport, In US, 65% Support Drone Attacks on Terrorists
Abroad, GALLUP (Mar. 25, 2013), https://news.gallup.com/poll/161474/supportdrone-attacks-terrorists-abroad.aspx; Jacquelyn Schneider and Julia Macdonald, U.S.
Public Support For Drone Strikes: When Do American Prefer Unmanned Over Manned
Platforms?, CENT. FOR A NEW AM. SECURITY (Sept. 20, 2016),
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/u-s-public-support-for- drone-strikes.
95
Tellingly, the most recent strategic documents by the U.S. military all
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MARINE CORPS, Commandant’s Planning Guidance: 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps
13; See also Matthew Fuhrmann and Michael C. Horowitz, Droning On: Explaining the
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robots.”99 Though a proposal still in its infancy,100 there are reasons to
be skeptical of its viability or staying power. The rapidity with which a
decision must be made as the technology advances will make effective
human control impossible. In fact, even so minimal a requirement as
“eyes on target” will become not only strategically but morally
untenable, as it will make collateral deaths more likely.101 Finally, the
relative ease with which nonstate actors can acquire the technology
means that state actors will struggle to limit their own use of such
instruments.
Simply put, these proposals are not equilibria. Actors face too many
pressures to deviate, to cheat, and to change the rules. Keith Abney
observes, “given ‘ought implies can,’ tactical and technical changes [in
warfare have] . . . led to changes in just war theory.”102 We should
recognize that international law will not succeed in prohibiting this
technology, and such efforts may prove very damaging along the
way.103 The technology will progress; we must use our imaginations so
that our laws and norms keep pace.104
2. Keep it Simple
When debating the ethics of drones, there is a tendency among
policymakers and especially among scholars to move too quickly into
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the weeds. For instance, Rosa Brooks, a law professor at Georgetown,
in testifying to Congress, moved quickly from “encourag[ing]
transparency” to forming “a non-partisan blue ribbon commission”
and concluding with “creating a [new] judicial mechanism, perhaps
similar to the existing Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court . . . ”105
It is perhaps unfair to criticize a lawyer in front of Congress for
focusing on legal remedies; but her testimony typifies a common
response. Often, discussion turns to debating legal and moral
intricacies accessible only to a highly educated audience.106 This
contrasts strikingly with the development of the nuclear taboo, which
began by drawing a distinction comprehensible to the ordinary man;
with the campaign to save the whales; and even with the imagination
of space as a commons rather than as private property. All of these,
while eventually highly technical and recondite, began with simple
ideas and simple illustrations. These ideas then informed the
imaginations of the publics and politicians whose beliefs would
structure subsequent cooperation.
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, the English Romantic, famously
compared imagination to a kind of healthy mania. This mania relates
everything to a central, organizing passion. He observed: “He that
knows the state of the human mind in deep passion must know, that
it approaches to that condition of madness, which is not absolute
frenzy or delirium, but which models all things to one reigning idea”107
Thomas Schelling’s work followed just this pattern: “extract the central
lessons (in this case from international strategy), capture them in
simple formulations, and describe them in language that is both lucid
and vivid.”108 He became the greatest of the nuclear strategists because
he understood the need to order complex phenomena around a simple
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center: “If you’re going to do theory and develop concepts that you
hope will help people have a deeper sense of the structure of some part
of the world, then give them concepts they can use easily.”109 Like his
books, his lectures at Harvard were celebrated for their illuminating
analogies, like comparing nuclear blackmail to child-rearing. Almost
alone among the defense intellectuals, Schelling was and remains
inescapable: “it is difficult to recall how the world looked before we
first saw it with the aid of Thomas Schelling’s vision.”110 We should
strive for the same clarity of insight. The time for details and minutiae
will come, but not until after the overarching ideas are in place. A focal
point, to facilitate cooperation, must stand out, and prominence
demands a kind of simplicity—a simplicity whose essence can be
quickly grasped, no matter how complex its details.
3. Start at the Top
Anne-Marie Slaughter, later the Director of Policy Planning
under Secretary Clinton, outlined in a 1997 Foreign Affairs article a
vision of “the real new world order.”111 In this vision, most
international cooperation occurs, not between heads of government,
but within transnational networks of bureaucrats, judges, regulators,
etc, and their counterparts abroad. For instance, “[j]udges are building
a global community of law,” she says, such as the Organization of the
Supreme Courts of the Americas.112 These networks bypass traditional
actors and treaty-making, focusing on extending cooperation at
alternative levels of the state. A similar argument is made by legal
scholars studying “global administrative law.”113 They emphasize the
progress of international legal cooperation among networks of lowlevel actors and organizations, especially when inter-state cooperation
is ineffective or slow-moving, or when existing treaties are inadequate
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to the problems at hand.114 This transnationalism comes to resemble a
new kind of constitutional regime in international law,115 and it is
unsurprising that it presents certain challenges to the norm of
sovereignty.116
Whether or not Slaughter correctly describes the emerging
“new world order,” it would be a mistake to begin with such midlevel
actors. The proliferation of low-tech drone technology117—which
scholarship on legal cooperation often ignores118—makes coordination
among the relevant actors daunting. These technologies
disproportionately benefit nonstate actors, especially terrorist groups,
and their usage will disrupt efforts at regulation by transnational
bureaucrats. Coordination would be better advised to begin at the
highest levels, where autonomous technologies are out of reach of all
but a few state actors.
Besides technological proliferation, there is a still more
important reason to begin with the big issues. The nuclear taboo was
created and sustained, not by transnational cooperation, but by the
moral imaginations of domestic and international publics. A
transnational approach would not appreciate “the importance of
democratizing domestic policymaking on nuclear weapons . . .
[including] civilian nuclear analysts and arms control groups, and other
groups in civil society, as well as public education about nuclear
weapons.”119 Whatever norms ultimately guide the use of autonomous
114
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systems, they must be ingrained in the popular consciousness before
they can constrain international actors. Bypassing the people will not
create a sustainable norm.
In the same way that the shaping of the public’s moral
imagination around a nuclear taboo was more important than the NPT
or arms control treaties, so too constraining autonomous systems will
depend on shaping the public imagination. Successfully confining
drones and “killer robots” will depend on the form these technologies
take in the public imagination. A better approach is that of normative
entrepreneurship. An extensive literature traces how entrepreneurial
actors construct normative frame.120 These figures focus on public
argumentation in order to frame elite-public discourse, which then
determines what sort of cooperation occurs.121 The insight of this
constructivist scholarship, in contrast to that of more institutionalist
approaches, is the need to create a social idea before mobilizing
institutional bodies. If there is no shared conception, there cannot be
a focal point of cooperation. Transnationalism, while perhaps an
appropriate tool down the road, must proceed from, and not precede,
the creation of a common moral axis around which the details of future
cooperation can revolve.
IV. CONCLUSION
To some extent, the dehumanizing influence of autonomous
systems cannot be escaped, but that does not mean it cannot be
counteracted. Nuclear weapons were far more dehumanizing than
drones or killer robots will ever be, and their inhumanity was
overcome. Their dehumanization was overcome by creating a focal
point that could stand out in the popular moral imagination. In some
ways, this point was arbitrary—in fact, there is no qualitative difference
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between nuclear and other weapons—but its arbitrariness does not
make it less ethically salient.
We can draw manifold lessons from nuclear strategy in the
moral imagination, but I briefly developed only three. I suggest the way
forward should begin by analyzing the incentives of the relevant actors.
Such an analysis requires us to look elsewhere than non-use or
abolition. It should then proceed to imaginative construction of focal
points around which cooperation might emerge. These foci will
necessarily be simple: experts who move too quickly to minutiaea
misunderstand the state of the problems we face. Finally, to construct
these imaginative foci, I suggest normative entrepreneurs begin at the
top and work their way down. By doing so, they will both bypass the
thorniest areas of cooperation (where the multiplicity of actors will
make coordination extremely difficult) and, more importantly, they will
form the moral imaginations of the most important actors: the
democratic publics and politicians who alone can sustain long-term
cooperation.
The dehumanizing effects of weapons like drones and nuclear
warheads cannot be counteracted in the moment of their use, nor in
adjustments to the technology itself, nor in the way strategy is
formulated; rather, the weapons are humanized by the ways the larger
culture comes to talk about them. So, here is the question facing the
next generation of weaponry: can we draw clear moral distinctions that
align with our incentives, focus our cooperation, and, by capturing our
imaginations, re-humanize a dehumanizing technology? It is the same
question that faced nuclear weapons in the early Cold War. Given our
success then, we need not fear a little optimism now.
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